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379 
INTIMATE AFFILIATION AND DEMOCRACY: 
BEYOND MARRIAGE? 
Linda C. McClain* 
I. INTRODUCTION: DOES THE PLACE OF MARRIAGE = THE PLACE OF 
FAMILIES? 
The place of marriage and its relation to the place of families in a 
just and fair constitutional democracy reverberates as one of the most 
challenging questions posed in debates over family law and policy. What 
is government’s interest in intimate affiliation and in families? What is 
the connection between the forms that intimate affiliation takes and the 
vitality of the Nation’s constitutional democracy? On the one hand, 
some voices urge that government should properly support and promote 
marriage, defined as the union of one man and one woman, as the proxy 
for the form of family best able to undergird constitutional democracy 
by allowing realization of the goods associated with family life and 
carrying out the important functions society assigns to families.1 On the 
other hand, critics of marriage’s privileged place contend that it is an 
imperfect and inadequate proxy for these purposes: it fails to represent 
the full range of forms of intimate affiliation capable of fostering family 
members’ capacities for self-government, of allowing the realization of 
such goods as interdependence, mutual support, and friendship, and of 
performing the vital function of nurturing children and other 
dependents.2 On this view, government should look beyond marriage—
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. E-mail: lawlcm@hofstra.edu. This 
Article takes its title from the final panel of the Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families, 
held at Hofstra University School of Law on March 14-15, 2003. I moderated that panel. Thanks to 
Hofstra research librarian Cindie Leigh for valuable help with sources. 
 1. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional 
Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 372 (2004) (noting that society seeks to further important 
interests in the fostering of families centered around marriage).  
 2. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239 
(2001) (arguing that marriage as a concept limits the development of family policy by precluding 
considerations of other solutions to social problems).  
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even if expanded to include same-sex marriage—to recognize and 
support a broader range of forms of families, such as the (single) parent-
child bond, the bonds of extended and complex families, and the bonds 
of friendship.3 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,4 which overruled Bowers v. Hardwick5 and struck down a Texas 
law that prohibited same-sex sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy, 
raised the stakes in these debates even higher. Even as the Court found a 
relevant family resemblance between the intimate sexual relationships of 
heterosexual married (and unmarried) couples and those of same-sex 
couples, using the language of “respect” to characterize what was due to 
such same-sex couples, it carefully put to the side the issue of official 
recognition of same-sex relationships of the sort marriage would 
provide.6 
Echoing dissenting Justice Scalia, who warned readers not to 
believe the majority’s disclaimer about same-sex marriage and chastised 
it for taking sides in the cultural war over homosexuality, some 
commentators on Lawrence also purport to read the judicial writing on 
the wall.7 Depending on one’s normative and political commitments, 
Lawrence’s recognition of constitutional protection of the intimate 
sexual relationships of same-sex couples leads either to increased hope 
for taking the further step of securing recognition of same-sex marriage, 
or to increased fear that, without measures such as the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment, both marriage and families face destruction. 
Voicing such fears, conservative family organizations criticize Lawrence 
as a blow to the “natural family” because it might open the door to 
recognizing same-sex marriage and repudiating the special gender 
complementarity of male and female that is the “fundamental nature” of 
                                                          
 3. See Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard for Marriages and Other Imperfect Intimate 
Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331, 346 (2003).  
 4. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 5. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, 2481-82, 2484. When this Article was in the 
final editing stage, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued an opinion in which it 
concluded that “limiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex 
couples violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under the Massachusetts 
Constitution.” Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (2003). Although, in this 
Article, I refer at a few points to the Goodridge opinion, I will not undertake a full discussion of it.  
 7. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an example of 
conservative opponents heeding Justice Scalia’s warning, see, Gerald V. Bradley, Stand and Fight: 
Don’t Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, NAT’L REV., July 28, 2003, at 26. 
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marriage.8 And yet, it is not only the slippery slope to same-sex marriage 
that alarms such critics. They fear a move beyond marriage itself, as 
society has known it and as much state and federal law defines it (a 
union of one man and one woman), in two additional senses. First, 
family law and policy might open up to extend marriage to “every 
conceivable combination of male and female,” including polygamy and 
polyamory (or group marriage).9 Second, an even steeper slippery slope 
could lead to the abolition of marriage itself, as a distinct legal category, 
in favor of a “system of flexible relationship contracts” that could extend 
to “polygamists, polyamorists, or even cohabiting relatives and 
friends.”10 Thus, the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, supported 
by the Bush Administration, would ward off these distinct threats by 
defining marriage throughout the United States as the union of one man 
and one woman and by prohibiting state and federal judges from 
construing state laws and constitutions to confer marriage-like benefits 
on nonmarital couples.11 Yet, even as self-identified “pro-family” groups 
view the ascent of such a flexible system as calamitous and socially 
destructive, some proponents of a more realistic and pluralistic family 
law and policy would welcome it.12 
                                                          
 8. See, e.g., Karen S. Peterson, Sodomy Ruling Gives Hope to Man, But Others Say Court 
Has Hurt “Natural” Family, USA TODAY, June 27, 2003, at 5A; Evelyn Nieves, Family Values 
Groups Gear Up for Battle Over Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at A6 (quoting the 
opinion of Focus on the Family’s Glenn Stanton that passing the Federal Marriage Amendment is 
the top priority for it because: “For us, . . . this is a fundamental question of how do male and female 
complement one another. It’s the fundamental nature of marriage.”). 
 9. See Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, at 26. 
 10. Id.  
 11. See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter 
Marriage Amendment]. The proposed amendment was most recently introduced in the House of 
Representatives on May 21, 2003. It reads: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups.  
Id. For President Bush’s support, see State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A18. 
 12. See infra Part III for a discussion of proposals by Judith Stacey and Martha Fineman. 
After Lawrence, journalist Michael Kinsley attracted attention for his proposal to resolve the 
controversy over same-sex marriage by abolishing marriage as a government-sanctioned institution, 
leaving religious institutions and other private organizations to offer various forms of marriage. 
Kinsley argues that “marriage is used as a substitute for other factors that are harder to measure, 
such as financial dependence or devotion to offspring,” and that “[i]t would be possible to write 
rules that measure the real factors at stake and leave marriage out of the matter.” Michael Kinsley, 
Abolish Marriage: Let’s Really Get the Government Out of Our Bedrooms, WASH. POST, July 3, 
2003, at A23. 
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This roundtable, “Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond 
Marriage?,”13 brought together a rich diversity of perspectives on the 
question, “should family law and policy move beyond marriage?” These 
answers ranged from an emphatic “no,” based on a defense of traditional 
marriage’s historical link to generating civic virtue and the dangers 
posed to the polity by any redefinition of marriage,14 to an equally 
emphatic “yes,” accompanied by a call to abolish marriage as a state-
sponsored institution (relegating adult intimate relationships to the realm 
of private contract) and to center family law around the parent-child, or 
caretaker-dependent relationship.15 In between these two opposing 
answers (offered, respectively, by family law scholars Lynn Wardle and 
Martha Fineman), are theologian and marriage movement figure Don 
Browning’s defense of marriage, properly reconstructed (what he calls 
the “equal-regard mother-father partnership”),16 and arguments by legal 
scholar Martha Ertman and sociologist Judith Stacey for a more 
pluralistic family policy that would show respect—or, as Stacey would 
extend Browning’s term, “equal regard”—both for marriage (including 
same-sex marriage) and for a broader array of contemporary family 
forms.17 Finally, panelist Suzanne Goldberg cautioned that skepticism 
may be in order about positing any significant relationship between 
forms of intimate self-government and democratic self-government.18 
This spectrum of views concerning how best to answer the question 
“beyond marriage?” has analogues in ongoing public discussion over 
whether marriage should maintain its favored place in family law and 
policy and whether government should promote marriage. Thus, 
canvassing the thoughtful answers presented on this panel (and 
published in this Symposium) offers a productive opportunity to assess 
                                                          
 13. A descriptive summary of the panel discussions that took place at this conference is 
available at http://www.hofstra.edu/academics/law/law_marriage_panels.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 
2004). 
 14. See Wardle, supra note 1, at 355.  
 15. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law 
Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families (Mar. 14, 2003) (presenting her paper, The 
Meaning of Marriage, at Panel on “Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Democracy?”) 
(videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review). Fineman’s paper will be a chapter in her forthcoming 
book, THE AUTONOMY MYTH. 
 16. Don Browning, Critical Familism, Civil Society, and the Law, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 313, 
314 (2003). 
 17. See Martha Ertman, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Conference on 
Marriage, Democracy, and Families (Mar. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review); 
see generally Stacey, supra note 3.  
 18. See Suzanne Goldberg, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Conference on 
Marriage, Democracy, and Families (Mar. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review). 
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the strengths and weaknesses of these answers and to clarify what is at 
stake in this broader public conversation.19 I also map out these answers 
to illuminate significant points of convergence and divergence among 
the panelists, as well as to situate my own answer. 
To the question, “should family law and policy move beyond 
marriage?,” I answer “yes and no.” I embrace moving beyond marriage 
in three relevant ways: (1) moving beyond “traditional” marriage to 
embrace more firmly sex equality, or equality within families, as a 
guiding norm for governmental efforts to support and encourage 
marriage; (2) moving beyond “traditional marriage,” defined as the 
union of one man and one woman, to recognize and support same-sex 
marriage as a step toward greater equality among families; and 
(3) moving beyond marriage by extending governmental support and 
recognition to other forms of committed, intimate relationships. But I 
also argue that society should not move wholly beyond marriage to 
abolish it as a legal category, relegating all adult intimate relationships to 
the realm of private contract. I cannot fully elaborate my approach in 
this forum, but in other writing I contend that a just and fair approach to 
the place of families in our constitutional democracy should attend to 
fostering capacity, equality, and responsibility. Two relevant dimensions 
of equality include equality within and equality among families.20 This 
framework will guide my engagement with my co-panelists’ diverse 
perspectives. 
II. ARGUMENTS THAT FAMILY LAW AND POLICY SHOULD NOT MOVE 
BEYOND MARRIAGE 
A. Defending Marriage: A Plea Not to “‘Change the Domestic Habits 
of the Americans’”21 
Lynn Wardle’s contribution to this Symposium emphasizes the role 
of marriage in constituting virtuous citizens. Revisiting ground made 
                                                          
 19. In order that readers of my evaluation of these views have the benefit of consulting the 
authors’ own articulations of their positions, I confine my focus to the three panelists whose 
contributions appear in this Symposium (Don Browning, Judith Stacey, and Lynn Wardle) and to 
panelist Martha Fineman, who presented a chapter from her forthcoming book, THE AUTONOMY 
MYTH. I am grateful to the other two panelists, Martha Ertman and Suzanne Goldberg, for the 
insightful presentations they made at the Conference, but I do not address their remarks here. 
 20. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming) [hereinafter THE PLACE OF FAMILIES].  
 21. Wardle, supra note 1, at 376 (quoting FRANCIS GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212-
13 (Harper 1959) (1839)).  
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familiar in recent years by proponents of reviving civil society, he 
invokes historical texts extolling the role of the marital family as the 
“seedbed of republican civic virtue,” the generator of domestic habits 
that in turn would undergird the constitutional republic.22 Wardle 
contends that the Founders viewed the marriage-based family as the 
“foundational unit of society and the seedbed of government,” and that 
this view also features in constitutional jurisprudence about families and 
contemporary political theories stressing civic renewal.23 By contrast, he 
warns, efforts to redefine marriage, by, for example, legalizing same-sex 
marriage, or to abolish marriage (as Fineman proposes), would “‘change 
the domestic habits of Americans’” in ways that “inevitably would lead 
to a radical variation of our constitutional government.”24 The stakes are 
high: “Our Constitution was founded on a particular vision of marriage. 
An abolition or radical redefinition will have extreme consequences for 
our government, probably within a generation.”25 
But what, exactly, was this “particular vision of marriage”? How 
did those in the founding era believe it generated virtue? Is this 
particular vision still resonant or appropriate today? Wardle invokes this 
vision of marriage without any apparent critical reflection on or critique 
of it. Nowhere in his account is the paradox that even as political 
ideology extolled married women, in their roles as wives and mothers, 
for generating civic virtue in their husbands and sons, the legal system 
denied them personal self-government within marriage, and all women 
were excluded from full participation in democratic self-government and 
from conceptions of the virtuous citizen.26 Indeed, even as a man’s role 
as husband, and head of the household, was thought to expand his 
                                                          
 22. See id. at 107-08. For contemporary calls to renew civil society that identify marriage’s 
role as a “seedbed of civic virtue,” see COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY 
(1988) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY]; Mary Ann Glendon, Forgotten Questions, in SEEDBEDS OF 
VIRTUE 3 (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) (noting accord among authors in 
collection as to the detrimental impact of the “weakening of child-raising families” on the 
development of virtuous citizens); NAT’L COMM’N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: 
HOW CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998), 
available at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/affiliates/civicrenewal/finalreport/table_of_contentsfinal_rep
ort.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2003) (calling for an increase in two-parent families and a reduction in 
teenage and nonmarital births). See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1989) (arguing 
that contemporary rights talk neglects the role of civil society in generating the virtues necessary for 
ordered liberty).  
 23. See Wardle, supra note 1, at 361, 364. 
 24. Id. at 128. 
 25. Id. at 130. 
 26. See generally LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998) 
(discussing the civic obligations from which women were excused because of their family 
obligations and the role this played in denying women participation in government). 
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capacity for citizenship, a woman’s role as wife carried with it 
diminished capacity and legal disabilities, some of which continued well 
into the last century.27 As historian Michael Grossberg observes, the 
model of the “republican family” of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century was that of a “well-ordered society: ‘a little 
commonwealth,’” in which the husband served as governor.28 And even 
though the rise of the model of “companionate” marriage led to a 
decreasing emphasis upon patriarchal marriage, this more “egalitarian” 
model of marriage still assigned greater authority to the husband and, in 
charging homes “with the vital responsibility of molding the private 
virtue necessary for republicanism to flourish,” enhanced “the 
importance of women’s family duties.”29 
Is it this “particular vision” of marriage that Wardle wishes to 
embrace as a generator of civic virtue? Constitutional jurisprudence 
itself has repudiated important components of this “particular vision” 
that established the husband as “head” of the household and wife as 
dependent, just as changes within family law have brought a move from 
the hierarchical household to marriage as an equal partnership with 
duties and rights not linked to sex.30 Thus, these legal revolutions have 
changed significantly “‘the domestic habits of the Americans.’”31 But 
rather than signaling the demise of the republic, courts and legislatures 
have praised these changes as appropriate “transformations” (as 
Massachusetts’ highest court recently put it) of the institution of 
marriage to bring it more into line with important constitutional 
commitments to individual liberty and equal citizenship.32 
                                                          
 27. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 
(2000); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 25-27 (1985); see generally HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: 
A HISTORY (2000) (discussing the role that marital separation played in the development of 
independent legal rights of women). 
 28. GROSSBERG, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
 29. Id. at 6-8. 
 30. See generally LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2000); D. 
KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 245-396 (2d ed. 2002) 
(containing a collection of cases, essays, and legislation tracking the changing nature of marriage 
and of roles and responsibilities within marriage). 
 31. Id. at 128 (quoting FRANCIS GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212-13 (Harper 1959) 
(1839)). 
 32. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897, 898 (1992) (striking down 
spousal notification provision in abortion law and repudiating the common law’s allocation to 
husbands of authority over wives as “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the 
individual, or the Constitution”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966-67 
(Mass. 2003) (describing marriage as “an evolving paradigm” and how courts and legislatures have 
ameliorated the common law’s “harshness” toward wives); Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. 
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Contemporary arguments about the place of marriage in generating 
civic virtue usefully bring to the fore what I believe is an important 
dimension of the place of families: fostering the capacities for personal 
and democratic self-government.33 However, I also contend that any 
contemporary argument for the role of families in generating civic virtue 
that appeals to the historical role of marriage as a seedbed of virtue must 
reckon with the historical link between civic virtue and sex inequality. It 
must consider whether it is possible to offer a contemporary argument 
for the marital family’s role in fostering virtue that respects the public 
value of sex equality and takes into account the transformation of the 
institution of marriage itself in light of norms of equal rights and 
responsibilities for men and women. In other writing, I have argued that 
some contemporary calls to renew civil society and shore up civic virtue 
fall short of facing these challenges.34 I am sympathetic to Wardle’s 
effort to argue for an important civic role for marriage, but I find that his 
account of the place of marriage similarly falls short. 
Wardle invokes historical texts extolling marriage’s civilizing role, 
and its place as a seedbed of democracy, without considering how the 
prevailing legal and social norms delineated proper gender roles and 
prescribed a gender complementarity that denied married women 
personal self-government. He does not adequately confront the question 
“if contemporary legal and social norms embrace a model of marriage 
that affirms equal rights and responsibilities for husbands and wives, and 
repudiate a form of gender complementarity based on fixed, hierarchical 
gender roles, what implications does this have for thinking about 
marriage as a seedbed of civic virtue?” Can historical arguments for the 
family’s role in generating virtue find persuasive contemporary 
translations? For example, does gender complementarity offer a 
persuasive contemporary justification for defining marriage exclusively 
as the union of one man and one woman? 
Gender complementarity is a key argument Wardle offers against 
redefining marriage to include same-sex unions.35 Like many opponents 
                                                          
Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008, 1009, 1010 (N.J. 1980) (rejecting as an “anachronism” and in 
conflict with constitutional norms the common law doctrine of a husband’s liability for a wife’s 
“necessaries”; adopting a gender-neutral rule more in keeping with the idea that “interdependence is 
the hallmark of a modern marriage”); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 579 (N.Y. 1984) 
(striking down marital rape exemption as not justifiable under notions of the constitutional right of 
privacy). 
 33. I elaborate this idea of fostering capacity in THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 20. 
 34. See Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, 
and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1643-53 (2001). 
 35. See Wardle, supra note 1, at 374. 
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of same-sex marriage, he contends that “[t]he bonding of male and 
female are essential features of human existence and of marriage.”36 It is 
this type of bond that secures the bonds of citizenship. But how? What 
form does this complementarity assume? Wardle speaks of 
contemporary marriages in terms of instilling civic skills of “mutual 
respect and cooperation” and urges a paradigm of “interdependence” to 
describe the “richness, mutuality, and practical reciprocity” of many 
marriages.37 But are these types of qualities unique to heterosexual 
intimate, committed relationships? More seems to be at work: the “core 
and essence of marriage” is “the integration of the universe of gender 
differences . . . associated with sexual identity”; the male-female union 
“‘[bridges] the sex-divide’” and thus sustains a “‘complex form of social 
interdependency.’”38 
What reliance does Wardle’s contemporary appeal to gender 
complementarity place upon marriage’s historical role in “bridging” the 
sex-divide, or in “integrating” gender differences? Does he mean to 
affirm or disavow this history? For example, 
the ideal of marriage as a ‘school of affection,’ and a foundation for 
national morality had a gendered dimension, reflecting eighteenth-
century assumptions about differences between the sexes: marriage, by 
associating men with women, would ‘gentle’ men, subdue their 
selflessness and egotism, and develop those qualities of the ‘heart’ and 
good manners that undergird the social virtues.39 
The law of marriage integrated the two sexes by establishing—indeed 
mandating—a binary or dyadic relationship between husband as head of 
household and economic provider and wife as dependent and dutiful 
provider of domestic services.40 Integration also found expression in the 
fiction of marital unity, which served both as explanation and 
justification for the suspension of a wife’s separate civil existence, her 
lack of legal capacity, and her lack of protection of her bodily integrity 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 126; see Nieves, supra note 8. 
 37. See Wardle, supra note 1, at 353, 373-74.  
 38. Id. at 126 (quoting DANIEL CERE, MARRIAGE/PARENTHOOD, LAWS OF DISSOLUTION 5, 
14-15 (March 12, 2003)).  
 39. Linda C. McClain, The Place of Marriage in Democracy’s Formative Project, 11:3 THE 
GOOD SOCIETY 50, 51 (2002) (discussing COTT, supra note 27, at 18-21); see Maura I. Strassberg, 
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 
1501, 1520-21 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878), about monogamous marriage as the foundation of democratic government relied 
upon Francis Lieber’s idea of marriage, which viewed women as different in nature and role from 
men and as fulfilling their highest potential as wives and mothers). 
 40. See Strassberg, supra note 39, at 1617.  
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in the case of spousal rape and assault.41 Well into the twentieth century, 
notions of the complementary roles of husband and wife, and women’s 
special responsibilities for domestic life, rationalized limitations on 
married women’s participation in economic, civic, and political life.42 
Such notions also had implications for how families, other institutions of 
civil society, and schools should prepare boys and girls to assume their 
proper roles. 
Evolving notions of gender equality and of the requirements of 
equal protection and freedom from discrimination have changed the 
nation’s “domestic habits” with respect to what form of gender 
complementarity marriage law mandates or permits. Indeed, 
constitutional precedents forbid states from using family law to 
perpetuate forms of gender complementarity once thought acceptable but 
now viewed as “archaic stereotypes.”43 Far from being a static feature of 
marriage, fixed by law, gender roles are dynamic and subject to 
individual revision and negotiation. To be sure, social norms about men 
and women, and husbands and wives, continue to exert a force on how 
married persons understand the role of husband or wife.44 But, as 
Fineman’s presentation on this panel elaborated, the shift to a gender-
neutral and more egalitarian conception of marriage opens up far more 
room for couples to pour their own meanings into marriage.45 
As is true of an appeal to the marital family’s role in generating 
virtue, an appeal to gender complementarity must attempt to offer a 
translation in keeping with contemporary public values and legal norms. 
Surely more critical reflection than Wardle offers is due upon the 
question of the evolving place of gender complementarity in marriage, 
and of law’s repudiation of the form embedded in the Founders’ 
“particular vision of marriage.” I believe that critical reflection and an 
attempt at translation are especially incumbent when proponents of 
gender complementarity invoke it as a ground for resisting the expansion 
of marriage to include the union of same-sex intimates. Otherwise, 
                                                          
 41. On the fiction of marital unity and the legal consequences of coverture, see WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442-45 (reprinted in WEISBERG AND 
APPLETON, supra note 30, at 253-54). 
 42. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding state law exempting 
women from the jury list unless they volunteered as a reasonable classification in light of fact that 
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life”). 
 43. See generally Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
 44. On this point, see, for example, Steven L. Nock, The Future of Public Laws for Private 
Marriage, 11:3 THE GOOD SOCIETY 74 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal 
Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1922 (2000). 
 45. See infra Part III.B for discussion. 
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defending restrictive marriage laws by simple reference to historical 
understandings of marriage as the union of one man and one woman (as, 
for example, some states have done in the challenges to their marriage 
laws) fails to address the question: why should these definitions continue 
to apply if the set of complementary sex-linked rights and obligations 
has given way, in light of evolving constitutional norms, to a set of 
gender-neutral rights and obligations?46 It is both possible and important 
to offer a contemporary argument for the place of families in fostering 
civic virtue. By contrast, I do not believe that the appeal to gender 
complementarity is a persuasive ground for opposing same-sex 
marriage.47 
Wardle also insists that heterosexual marriage provides the best 
environment for rearing children, because such marriages “model inter-
gender relations and show children how to relate to persons of their own 
and the opposite gender.”48 This is also a frequent ground for opposing 
same-sex marriage, yet here too, I believe that the appeal to gender 
complementarity is not a persuasive argument against redefining 
marriage to include same-sex unions. Wardle contends that parenting by 
heterosexual parents is more optimal for children, but other scholars 
sharply contest this claim.49 Studies indicate that gay- and lesbian-
headed families fare as well or better than heterosexual couples on 
                                                          
 46. For an example of such an appeal, see Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 17-18, Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) [hereinafter Brief of 
Defendants-Appellees] (challenging Massachusetts’ marriage laws in a case recently decided before 
its Supreme Judicial Court). I discuss the challenge to Massachusetts’s law and the State of 
Massachusetts’s appeal to gender complementarity in Chapter 6 of THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra 
note 20. See also Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good 
Lives, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 19, 115-24 (1998) [hereinafter Toleration] (discussing same-sex marriage); 
Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1998) [hereinafter Deliberative Democracy] (critiquing natural law 
arguments against same-sex marriage). 
 47. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972-73 (Greany, J., concurring) (calling for critical 
reexamination of assumptions about historically accepted roles of women and men within 
marriage); cf. Strassberg, supra note 39, at 1623 (concluding that a contemporary argument in favor 
of monogamy and against polygamy, which attends to constitutional norms of sex equality, 
supports, rather than opposes, extending marriage to same-sex couples). 
 48. Wardle, supra note 1, at 375. 
 49. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 863-64 (contending that social science literature suggests that children in 
same-sex families are harmed by the intimate relationships of their parents and arguing for a 
rebuttable legal presumption of harm) with Carlos A. Ball and Janice Farrell Pea, Warring With 
Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 255-56 
(1998) (rebutting Wardle’s assessment of the social science literature and arguing that gay and 
lesbian parents should be evaluated individually on the basis of their ability to be good parents 
instead of on an assumption based on sexual orientation). 
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measures pertaining both to the quality of the adult-adult relationship 
and to effective parenting.50 Indeed, a number of state courts and 
legislators have supported recognizing parental rights for both members 
of a same-sex couple (for example, through second-parent adoption) 
because of their capacity to be responsible, loving parents and to foster 
child well-being.51 Once a state moves in this direction of greater legal 
protection because this is in the best interests of children, these steps 
toward equality among families seem on a collision course with claims 
that children’s best interests require opposite-sex parents because of 
unique parenting roles linked to sex difference.52 
In ruling that the Common Benefits Clause of Vermont’s 
Constitution required that the benefits and protections incident to 
marriage flowed to same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples, 
the court found that the State could not justify excluding same-sex 
couples from these benefits either as a means of furthering its interest in 
“promoting a permanent commitment between couples for the security 
of their children” or in “promoting child rearing in a setting that provides 
both male and female role models.”53 Legislative efforts to remove 
affirmative obstacles to same-sex couples legally adopting and rearing 
children reflected a public policy “diametrically at odds” with the state’s 
assertion of such exclusion.54 Instead, the court found same-sex and 
                                                          
 50. See SUZANNE J. JOHNSON AND ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD (2003); Jane E. Brody, Gay Families Flourish as Acceptance 
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at F7 (discussing Johnson and O’Connor book and profiling 
various families). 
 51. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317-20 (Mass. 1993) (finding that 
allowing the biological parent and her intimate same-sex partner to adopt the child served the 
child’s best interests because each was a functional parent, and favorably citing testimony that child 
was “extremely well-adjusted, bright, creative [and] cheerful.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 
(Vt. 1999) (noting that the Vermont legislature had removed barriers to nonmarital couples, 
including same-sex couples adopting children); In the Matter of Adoption of Two Children by 
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (construing New Jersey’s adoption 
statute to permit adoption by biological mother’s same-sex partner). See generally Nancy D. 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990) (calling 
for further judicial developments along these lines). 
 52. For example, Massachusetts has taken such steps, see supra note 46, but nonetheless in its 
defense of its marriage laws argued that the legislature “could rationally believe that limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples serves the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest in fostering a 
favorable setting for child-rearing.” Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 46, at 117. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected this argument. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
962-63 (“Protecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy. Restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples, however, cannot plausibly further this policy.”). 
 53. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881, 884. 
 54. See id. at 884. 
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opposite-sex couples similarly situated in desiring to enter into marriage 
to provide security and stability for their family.55 And when the 
Vermont legislature passed the law creating civil unions for same-sex 
couples (with the benefits and obligations linked to marriage), it noted: 
“The state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, 
including families based upon a same-sex couple.”56 Like Vermont’s 
Supreme Court, it stressed meritorious sameness between same-sex 
families and marital families: 
Despite long standing social and economic discrimination, many gay 
and lesbian Vermonters have formed lasting, committed, caring, and 
faithful relationships with persons of their same sex. These couples 
live together, participate in their communities together, and some raise 
children and care for family members together, just as do couples who 
are married under Vermont law.57 
Such appeals to sameness have supported appropriate movement in 
the direction of equality among families. Yet, nonharmful—and even 
meritorious—differences may also counsel support for such equality. As 
my co-panelist Judith Stacey has found, Wardle correctly criticizes some 
studies for minimizing differences between same-sex and opposite-sex 
households.58 However, to the extent that there are detectable differences 
in the impact on children from being raised by homosexual rather than 
heterosexual parents, these differences, rather than diminishing child 
well-being, may be salutary (for example, children in same-sex 
households appear to have a less rigid view of gender roles and 
identity).59 
In sum, the issue of the relationship between family forms and 
values and constitutional democracy is a challenging one. Wardle 
                                                          
 55. See id. at 889. In Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), the Hawaii Circuit Court rejected the state’s argument that 
optimal development of children required that families consist of married, biological (or at least 
heterosexual) parents in light of expert testimony that gay and lesbian parents can be “as fit and 
loving parents, as non-gay men and women and different-sex couples.” It found that the State could 
not satisfy its burden of showing a compelling interest that justified excluding gay men and lesbians 
from marriage and therefore was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws. 
Nonetheless, the voters of Hawaii authorized a constitutional amendment that declared that “[t]he 
legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 
23. 
 56. An Act Relating To Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (codified at VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 1201-1207 (Supp. 2001)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160, 161 (2001). 
 59. See id. at 162-64. 
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usefully highlights this issue, and notes that we share an interest in 
arguing for an important civic role for marriage and families.60 But his 
account insufficiently attends to equality within or among families, two 
dimensions of equality that I contend should inform thinking about the 
place of families. Let me be clear: I do not charge Wardle with 
embracing, in whole cloth, all the social and legal inequality that is part 
of marriage’s history. Yet his failure to repudiate this history explicitly 
and to clarify how a contemporary argument for gender complementarity 
would respect women’s equal citizenship limits the persuasiveness of his 
approach. Similarly, I do not find Wardle’s appeal to gender 
complementarity as a precondition for optimal child development 
persuasive, and do not believe that it can sustain his plea not to change 
the “‘domestic habits of the Americans’”61 by extending marriage to 
same-sex couples. 
B. Defend but Reconstruct Marriage: “Critical Familism” 
My co-panelist Don Browning also answers “no” to the question of 
whether society and family law should move beyond marriage.62 But by 
contrast to Wardle’s straightforward appeal to tradition, Browning 
advocates a cultural strategy of “critical familism.”63 The core of critical 
familism is reconstructing family and marriage to support the “equal-
regard mother-father team with equal privileges and responsibilities in 
both the public worlds of politics and employment and the more private 
realms of home, child rearing, and intergenerational care.”64 The 
“critical” component of this “familism” stems from its commitment “to 
expose, critique, and reform distortions of social, economic, and political 
power that function to block or undermine the free formation and 
support of the equal-regard mother-father partnership.”65 A theologian, 
Browning maintains that the principles for this critique may be drawn 
from Jewish and Christian traditions, as well as from contemporary 
moral philosophy.66 Moreover, as Browning explains in other work, 
these traditions, which have “had so much to do with shaping American 
lore and law about families are now interacting with other powerful 
                                                          
 60. See Wardle, supra note 1, at 349, 378. 
 61. Id. at 128 (quoting FRANCIS GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212-13 (Harper 1959) 
(1839)). 
 62. Browning, supra note 16, at 329. 
 63. See generally id. 
 64. Id. at 101. 
 65. Id. at 102. 
 66. See id. 
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traditions—Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, neo-Confucian, Native 
American—that not only want social space to exercise their own family 
identities but eventually will want their say on issues pertaining to the 
larger public philosophy concerning families.”67 Thus, the eventual goal 
of critical familism is looking for analogies among all of these religious 
traditions pertinent to marriage and family.68 
Browning describes “critical familism” as primarily a “cultural 
strategy—indeed a religiocultural strategy—to be carried out principally 
by the institutions of civil society.”69 This “reweaving the social 
tapestry” to renew a marriage culture will require the cooperation of 
government, religious, cultural, and other institutions of civil society, 
and the market.”70 Thus, family law “should do nothing to undermine 
this normative model,” but instead should support it.71 
Critical familism defines marriage primarily “with its child rearing 
tasks envisioned as central.”72 Drawing not only on theological and 
philosophical, but also evolutionary biology sources, it stresses the 
“momentously important cultural accomplishment of human males 
joining the mother-infant dyad and contributing to the provision and care 
for their offspring and consorts.”73 Like much of the marriage 
movement, critical familism views anchoring men within families as one 
important reason that society should support and promote marriage. In 
other writing, Browning calls this the “male problematic,” or “the 
primordial male tendency to procreate but not to care for offspring or 
mate.”74 It is notable that even Browning, whose call for a “critical” 
marriage culture is the strand within the marriage movement most 
embracing of the need for sex equality as part of a contemporary public 
philosophy of marriage, identifies this “male problematic,” and views 
marriage as the best institutional framework for anchoring male 
                                                          
 67. DON S. BROWNING & GLORIA G. RODRIGUEZ, REWEAVING THE SOCIAL TAPESTRY 22 
(2002). 
 68. For example, Browning played a role in organizing a conference held at Emory Law 
School on religions of the book. See Brochure, Sex, Marriage and Family & The Religions of the 
Book: Modern Problems, Enduring Solutions (announcing the presentation of an international 
conference on March 27-29, 2003), available at http://www.law.emory.edu/cisr/documents/SMF-
Brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). 
 69. Browning, supra note 16, at 314-15. 
 70. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 93.  
 71. Browning, supra note 16, at 314. 
 72. Id. at 314. 
 73. Id. at 319. 
 74. DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND 22 (2d ed. 
2000).  
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commitment.75 He suggests that the contemporary challenge is to secure 
men’s responsibility to women and children without supporting 
patriarchal control within families (for example, he rejects Biblical 
interpretations that ordain male “headship” as authority over wife and 
children in favor of interpretations that support mutuality and equal 
access by men and women to the responsibilities of public and domestic 
realms).76 
Precisely because critical familism views this cultural task of 
uniting the male with the mother-infant unit as the core of marriage, it is 
uneasy about moving beyond marriage.77 Such moves, it warns, could 
undermine, rather than support, the equal-regard mother-father team.78 It 
calls for “a range of universal supports and remedies for all families with 
children,” but cautions against moving beyond marriage, by “efforts to 
delegalize the marital relation and grant legal status only to parenthood, 
or perhaps mainly to mothers.”79 This, Browning warns, could require 
“heroic redefinitions of inherited cultural patterns,” and would be 
“ineffective and culturally destructive.”80 Similarly, in his co-authored 
works on the family, he has taken a position against “the extension of 
marriage-like privileges through the institution of domestic partnership,” 
because this poses a “threat to the institution of marriage.”81 On the issue 
of same-sex marriage, critical familism takes no stand, because of the 
complex scholarly issues it raises and the ongoing public debate over 
it.82 
Does critical familism offer a persuasive answer to the question 
“beyond marriage?” Certainly, its reconstructive approach to marriage 
holds great promise, and is more in keeping with contemporary 
constitutional and social norms of sex equality than a stance of 
defending traditional marriage. But I will contend that its reconstructive 
impulse does not extend far enough in the direction of equality among 
families. Moreover, other features of critical familism may limit its 
suitability as the basis for a public philosophy about families, and a 
guide to family law and policy. I will focus on four aspects of critical 
familism: (1) its call for reconstructing rather than simply shoring up 
                                                          
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 322-23; BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 121-22.  
 78. See BROWNING, supra note 74, at 322-23; BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 
121-22. 
 79. Browning, supra note 16, at 327. 
 80. Id. 
 81. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 159-61. 
 82. Id. 
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marriage; (2) its insistence that religious traditions about family and 
marriage should contribute to shaping public policy; (3) its vision of 
marriage as a way of solving the problem of connecting men to the 
mother-infant dyad; and (4) its internal tension between seeking to 
support all families with children and warning against family law and 
policy developing alternatives to marriage. 
First, in contrast to many figures in the marriage movement who 
express ambivalence about, or reject, sex equality as a guiding norm for 
how to support marriage, Browning expressly embraces equality within 
marriage as a norm that emerges through critical retrieval of marriage 
traditions.83 Thus, critical familism appears committed to undertake the 
reconstructive work that many defenses of marriage (for example, 
Wardle’s appeal to tradition) do not: retrieving and critiquing tradition 
rather than simply affirming it. For example, rather than offering a 
religious defense of gender complementarity based on biblical teaching 
about the husband being the head of the household and the wife having a 
duty to obey, Browning and his associates at the Religion, Culture, and 
Family Project at the University of Chicago are critical of Christian pro-
family groups who espouse this form of gender complementarity.84 
Critical familism’s recognition of the need for critical engagement with 
cultural and religious tradition is laudable. It has an affinity to important 
efforts by feminist scholars to challenge monolithic presentations of 
“culture” and of “religion” that purportedly justify gender subordination. 
Such challenges seek to bring to light internal contestation and dissent 
over what culture and religion teach.85 
But even though critical familism embraces sex equality as a 
guiding norm for heterosexual marriage, it is uneasy with a form of sex 
equality that would affirm and support motherhood outside of marriage, 
and it does not counsel support for same-sex marriage. Because it views 
the father-mother equal-regard team as the aspirational norm for family 
formation, other families seem to feature only as examples of “family 
disruption,”86 or as “heroic” attempts at family redefinition.87 I believe 
                                                          
 83. I address the marriage movement in Chapter 5 of my forthcoming book, THE PLACE OF 
FAMILIES, supra note 20. 
 84. See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 74, at 231-46. 
 85. See generally UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES (1997) (discussing the problems 
that arise from assumptions regarding the understanding of the concept of “culture”); Madhavi 
Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (discussing how female activists in Muslim 
communities and countries have challenged entrenched religious and political leadership’s 
interpretation of the role of women in Islam). 
 86. See Browning, supra note 16, at 327. 
 87. Id. 
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that a viable and just approach to family law and policy must have more 
room for family diversity, as I discuss below. 
Second, Browning argues that cultural renewal of marriage must 
rest upon a public philosophy of marriage, which enlists the language of 
health (for example, claims that marriage fosters adult happiness and 
child well-being), but also the language of religion.88 Browning further 
contends that “positions on family theory informed by explicitly 
religious sources have the right to enter into deliberations aimed to shape 
public policy,” provided that they “advance their arguments in publicly 
accessible ways.”89 Such a public philosophy, which would be a more 
comprehensive cultural and moral framework within which to 
understand marriage, would engage with and critically retrieve not only 
marriage “classics” of the Western tradition, such as Biblical and 
theological texts and teachings about marriage, but also seek to develop 
analogies among a broader range of cultural and religious traditions, 
including (as noted above) Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, neo-Confucian, 
and Native American religions.90 
There is an interesting parallel here between Browning’s argument 
and calls to renew civil society that identify fashioning a “public moral 
philosophy” as a key to civic and moral renewal and view religious 
institutions as playing a key role in generating that philosophy.91 In 
addition, the claim that out of these Western classics would emerge a 
public philosophy about marriage on which there would be widespread 
cultural agreement has some resemblance to political liberalism’s appeal 
to an overlapping consensus, where persons can draw upon their 
comprehensive moral views to find agreement about important political 
principles or public values.92 But Browning quests for a comprehensive 
public moral philosophy and looks to religious texts as the source of the 
values and moral claims, or what he calls “intrinsic moments,” that are 
the ends associated with marriage.93 Is such a philosophy—drawn 
especially from religious sources—possible or appropriate, given the 
diversity of views that people hold about sexuality, family, and 
                                                          
 88. See generally Don S. Browning, The Language of Health Versus the Language of 
Religion: Competing Models of Marriage for the Twenty-First Century, in REVITALIZING THE 
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29-43 (Alan J. Hawkins et al., eds., 
2002). 
 89. Browning, supra note 16, at 317. 
 90. See BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 26-43; Browning, supra note 16, at 323. 
 91. See CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 22, at 21. 
 92. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15 (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 801 (1997). 
 93. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 75. 
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marriage, and given the fact that marriage is also a civil status, a state-
recognized relationship? 
How will Browning’s project address a second form of diversity: 
diversity within specific religious traditions? There are contests within 
religious communities over how best to interpret the import of such 
traditions on such matters as family, marriage, and the respective family 
roles of men and women.94 If government is to play a role in supporting 
and promoting such a public philosophy developed through dialogue 
with these traditions, to whom will it listen as representing such 
traditions? For example, feminist legal scholar Mahdavi Sunder 
contends that “religious communities are internally contested, 
heterogeneous, and constantly evolving over time through internal 
debate and interactions with outsiders.”95 One result of this process is 
that “[t]oday, individuals seek reason, equality and liberty not just in the 
public sphere, but also in the private spheres of religion, culture, and 
family.”96 Yet too often, when courts and legislatures confront claims 
based on religion, they view religion as static and unchanging, and 
“defer to fundamentalist claims to discriminate in the name of religion or 
culture, thwarting the claims of dissenting women and other advocates 
of change.”97 
This problem of thwarting dissent and calls for change is especially 
worrisome given that religious and cultural traditions often assign to 
women special responsibilities for transmitting and preserving tradition, 
and it is precisely in the areas of family and marriage that religious and 
cultural teachings about the respective capacities, rights, and duties of 
men and women have been invoked to justify large constraints on 
women’s agency.98 Moreover, as Uma Narayan observes, in battles over 
“Third-World” traditions and Westernization, “selective appropriations” 
of Western modernity often have accompanied a heightened emphasis 
upon preserving women’s distinctive spiritual roles in the domestic 
sphere.99 Browning also recognizes that criticism can come from within 
traditions themselves.100 But how would critical familism take steps to 
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 85. 
 95. Id. at 1402-03. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1425. 
 98. See generally AYALET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001) (discussing the ways in which legal accommodations 
to distinct cultural groups can serve to reinforce the hierarchal and patriarchal structures within such 
groups); see NARAYAN, supra note 85, at 14-20. 
 99. See NARAYAN, supra note 85, at 28-29.  
 100. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 36. 
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ensure that interpretations least compatible with women’s equal 
citizenship do not crowd other voices out of the public square? 
In a quest for a public philosophy about marriage and families, 
critical familism’s definition of equal-regard by reference to equal rights 
and responsibilities would be in competition with other religious 
interpretations of the equality of men and women that embrace different 
rights and responsibilities for women and men in family life and in other 
spheres of society.101 Notably, even critical familism’s embrace of equal 
regard cautions that this does not mean suppressing “the distinctiveness 
of being male and female,” and that, guided by a “strenuous love ethic of 
regarding the other with equal seriousness,” husband and wife “should 
work together to determine their responsibilities and privileges in light 
of respective talents, inclinations, and realistic constraints.”102 For 
example, Browning mentions the “asymmetrical nature of male and 
female investments on certain matters such as procreation and child 
care,” and notes that equal-regard “does not necessarily imply moment 
by moment identical treatment.”103 But will his further guideline, that it 
does require “equality over the marital life cycle,” prevail over 
competing interpretations of religious teachings about equality amidst 
differences that would justify differential rights and responsibilities 
throughout the marital life cycle based on differential capabilities? As I 
argued in critiquing Wardle’s defense of marriage, this sort of 
differential assignment, if also embraced by governmental efforts to 
support families, would violate contemporary norms of family law and 
requirements of equal protection. 
The quest for a public philosophy about marriage raises a 
significant question: could there be consensus on the personal and social 
goods linked to and values embedded in marriage? Is such a public 
philosophy necessary if government is to play a role—as current welfare 
legislation proposes it should do—in promoting “healthy marriage?”104 I 
agree with Browning that if government is to play a role in creating a 
“critical marriage culture,” then sex equality should inform such a public 
                                                          
 101. See Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: 
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 189, 193, 194 (2002) (discussing model of equality within Islam that views potential 
capabilities of men and women as equally important but different). 
 102. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 36-39. 
 103. Browning, supra note 16, at 317. 
 104. See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4, 108th 
Cong. § 103 (2003) (passed by the House); Compassion and Personal Responsibility Act, S. 5, 
108th Cong. § 103 (2003) (pending in the Senate). Both bills include funds for the promotion of 
marriage. 
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philosophy. This is especially important as lawmakers contemplate using 
religious organizations to engage in marriage promotion. I further agree 
with Browning that a public philosophy that arises out of critical 
engagement with, rather than simple affirmance of, tradition should 
reject models of family premised on a hierarchy of male leadership. But 
I would go further than critical familism and argue that such critical 
engagement counsels critique of such measures as the Defense of 
Marriage Act105 and the pending Federal Marriage Amendment.106 Such 
laws and proposed laws merely entrench marriage as the union of “one 
man and one woman” because of tradition, and fail to look at how this 
marriage definition entailed forms of gender complementarity associated 
with earlier family systems of gender hierarchy, some of which were 
rooted in religious teachings as well as cultural traditions.107 As I argued 
above in critiquing Wardle’s defense of gender complementarity, critical 
reflection upon the evolution within law away from such hierarchy and 
sex-linked roles toward marriage as an equal partnership with mutual 
rights and obligations also calls into question whether the union of one 
man and one woman must be an essential of marriage and a prerequisite 
for realizing the goods linked to marriage. I contend that critical 
reflection would lead to the conclusion that marriage law should extend 
to two adults of the same sex who are prepared to enter into the 
committed, intimate, interdependent relationship entailed by marriage.108 
My third and fourth concerns about critical familism arise from its 
vision of marriage as solving the “male problematic.” Browning 
contends that a central reconstructive task of critical retrieval of cultural 
and religious traditions about marriage is to reformulate “the 
understanding of male authority and male responsibility” in order to 
disentangle this responsibility (father’s willing investment in mothers 
and children) from patriarchal marriage and anchor it in equal-regard 
                                                          
 105. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 106. See Marriage Amendment, supra note 11. 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41; Deliberative Democracy, supra note 46, at 
1249-50 (critiquing the Defense of Marriage Act). On the import of this move away from fixed 
gender roles for the same-sex marriage debate, see Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A 
Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 16-17 (1991). 
 108. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[I]t is the 
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of 
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.”); see generally Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage 
Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. 
REV. 265, 292 (2000); see also David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage 
and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 465 (1996) (arguing 
that the ends marriage law serve fit closely with the needs of same-sex couples). 
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marriage.109 I fear that conceiving marriage’s central task in this way 
assigns to women a special role of taming, or domesticating, men. And I 
also worry that this focus prevents critical familism from moving far 
enough toward supporting equality among families. 
Marriage’s role in taming men and women’s special role as 
gatekeepers in matters of sexuality, reproduction, and family, are both 
featured in contemporary discourse about marriage as an important 
justification for promoting marriage.110 In much of this rhetoric, the 
portrait of the place of marriage in civilizing men and the harm to 
society if men are not civilized through marriage insults men’s moral 
capacity even as it unjustly burdens women with the task of taming men. 
Moreover, the continuing hold of some of the hierarchical notions of 
marriage that Browning would repudiate—such as men as heads of 
household and leader/provider—raises important questions about 
whether the supposed “male problematic” may be solved in a way 
compatible with sex equality. Do men, for example, need the perk of 
being “head of the household” in order to accept the responsibility the 
roles of husband and father entail? Even if there are, as Browning 
contends, evolutionary as well as cultural roots to this “male 
problematic,” contemporary constitutional and family norms of women’s 
equal citizenship demand that the problem be solved in a way that does 
not support or perpetuate sex inequality.111 Moreover, the argument that 
marriage civilizes men also features in some arguments in favor of 
same-sex marriage, suggesting that it may be the institution of marriage, 
and the sort of commitment it symbolizes, rather than the heterosexual 
bond, that brings about this salutary effect of anchoring male 
commitment.112 Yet the marriage movement generally does not support 
same-sex marriage.113 
Parallel to a “male problematic,” critical familism identifies a 
“female problematic,” or the tendency of women to “suppress their own 
needs and raise children without paternal participation, sometimes under 
                                                          
 109. BROWNING & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 67, at 36-38. 
 110. See THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 20.  
 111. See supra Part II.A for a critique of gender complementarity. For the idea of sex equality 
as an important public value and part of civic virtue, see McClain, supra note 26. 
 112. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 8-10 (1996). 
 113. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage for? The Public Purposes of Marriage 
Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 790 (2002) (critiquing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 881 (Vt. 1999), for 
denying marriage’s “great universal anthropological imperative” of encouraging ties between 
fathers, mothers, and their children). But see David Brooks, The Power of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2003, at A15 (chastising other conservatives in the marriage movement for failing to 
“insist on gay marriage”). 
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great stress and at great cost.”114 Marriage, it contends, solves this 
problem.115 But, if such a problematic exists, is the only feasible or just 
way to solve it through promoting marriage? One logical inference from 
the marriage movement’s claim that the mother-child bond is strong, 
even apart from marriage, and less precarious than the connection 
between women and men and between fathers and children, might be 
that we should premise family policy (as my co-panelist Martha 
Fineman argues)116 on supporting that bond. 
Critical familism’s insistence upon putting the equal-regard mother-
father team at the core of a public philosophy about marriage and 
families creates an internal tension between seeking to support all 
families with children and warning against family law and policy 
developing alternatives to marriage. Because critical familism seeks to 
keep bundled together the sexual or conjugal bond and the parenting 
bond, marriage appears to be the best institutional arrangement. Single-
parent families, on this view, must appear as disrupted or fragmented 
families because they deviate from the “mother-father team”; thus, while 
Browning is concerned to support all families, he also critiques welfare 
programs for contributing to family “fragmentation,”117 and he warns 
against separating the parental relation from the marriage tie.118 
By contrast, as I shall next discuss, the complex family 
arrangements described in my co-panelist Judith Stacey’s contribution to 
this Symposium offer examples of families in which securing men’s 
investment in the children they father need not be linked to a male-
female marital bond. I think that Stacey is right to attempt to extend 
Browning’s important idea of “equal-regard” beyond the marital family. 
Thus, my final point of disagreement with Browning’s critical familism 
is that I contend that respect for equality among families—and for 
women’s and men’s personal self-government in the areas of intimacy 
and family—should inform a policy of supporting not only marriage but 
also other forms of family that can foster orderly social reproduction and 
allow realization of the values and goods associated with families. This 
approach is appropriate in a constitutional democracy characterized by 
reasonable moral pluralism and that accords respect (as the Lawrence 
                                                          
 114. BROWNING ET AL., supra note 74, at 106.  
 115. See generally Browning, supra note 16. 
 116. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Fineman, supra note 2 (arguing that 
family policy concerns should be focused less on marriage and more on the bond between mother 
and child). 
 117. See Browning, supra note 16, at 323. 
 118. See id. at 109. 
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Court indicates)119 to persons’ exercise of personal autonomy free from 
unwarranted governmental interference in matters of sexual intimacy, 
reproduction, and family.120 As the Lawrence Court recognized, this 
constitutional liberty flows to individuals even when persons condemn 
their sexuality based upon “profound and deep convictions accepted as 
ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus 
determine the course of their lives.”121 I believe that a fair inference to 
be drawn from Lawrence’s account of toleration and its language of 
“respect” is that such respect for personal self-government in a 
reasonably morally diverse or pluralistic society would require not just 
protection against the coercive force of the criminal law, but also would 
restrict government’s ability to favor and promote heterosexual marital 
families as the best and exclusive family form worthy of support.122 
My critique of critical familism should not obscure what I believe 
are its attractive elements: its insistence upon “equal-regard” as a 
constitutive norm for marriage and its quest to generate a public 
philosophy about families that critically engages and reconstructs, rather 
than reifies, tradition.123 Moreover, it also has a self-described “radical 
edge,” which would support governmental efforts to contain the reach of 
the market and to encourage business and industry to adopt workweeks 
and structures more conducive to parents enjoying the privileges and 
responsibilities of participation in civic and economic life as well as in 
the tasks of childrearing and intergenerational care.124 Indeed, it strikes 
me that this element of critical familism (present, to some extent, in the 
broader marriage movement)125 may be a valuable piece of common 
ground with many feminist approaches to family. For example, at a time 
when the Bush Administration and Congress seek to raise the required 
workweek for welfare recipients from thirty hours to forty hours per 
                                                          
 119. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003). 
 120. I draw support from the account of how political liberalism views the family in Rawls, 
supra note 69, at 789-90. As noted supra text accompanying note 4, Lawrence speaks of respect for 
intimate decisionmaking in the context of barring the state’s use of the criminal law to invade the 
home and punish consensual, private, sexual conduct. See id. at 2484.  
 121. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 122. See generally Toleration, supra note 45 (explaining this idea of toleration as respect).  
 123. See generally Browning, supra note 16. 
 124. Id. at 113-14. 
 125. See, e.g., COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND COUPLES EDUCATION, INSTITUTE FOR 
AMERICAN VALUES, RELIGION, CULTURE, & FAMILY PROJECT, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO DIVINITY 
SCHOOL, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2000), available at 
http://www.marriagemovement.org/html/report.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2004) (listing as a 
principle of the marriage movement the request that government not “discourage marital 
interdependence by penalizing unpaid work in homes and communities”).  
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week, and to eliminate supposed disincentives to marriage by imposing 
this same forty hour requirement on single-parent and two-parent 
families, proponents of critical familism advocate a thirty hour 
workweek for single parents, and a total of sixty hours for a two-parent 
family.126 Shifting the focus to how to facilitate the sort of parental 
investment that secures good conditions for child rearing, and thus child 
well-being, could offer an important standpoint from which to critique 
such welfare policies. 
III. ARGUMENTS THAT FAMILY LAW AND POLICY SHOULD MOVE 
BEYOND MARRIAGE 
A. Move Partially Beyond Marriage to “Equal-Regard” for 
“Functional” Families 
Answering a qualified “yes” to the question, “beyond marriage?,” 
sociologist Judith Stacey picks up on Browning’s language of equal-
regard to call for a more pluralistic and realistic family policy that would 
support and show respect for marriage (including same-sex marriage) as 
well as for “intimate affiliations formed beyond marriage.”127 Viewing 
the abolishment of marriage as unrealistic (even though she concurs with 
much of Fineman’s diagnosis of marriage’s unjustifiable position of 
privilege), she instead argues that “we should work to further 
democratize, pluralize, and decenter marriage, rather than to eliminate 
it.”128 Stacey argues that “[f]amily diversity is an irreversible feature of 
the postmodern family landscape” (what she calls the “postmodern 
family condition”).129 Thus, she takes issue with Browning’s assignment 
of primacy to the mother-father dyad, which unites conjugal and parental 
passions through marriage.130 She counters by stating that part of the 
postmodern family condition is precisely a “disjuncture between 
                                                          
 126. Compare Browning, supra note 16, and BROWNING ET AL., supra note 74, at 327-28, with 
The Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 110, 
and The White House, News & Policies, February 2002, Working Toward Independence, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book-all.html 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2004).  
 127. See Stacey, supra note 3, at 331-33. 
 128. Id. at 113. 
 129. Id. at 108. For elaboration on her idea of the postmodern family, see JUDITH STACEY, 
BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (1998); JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN 
THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996). 
 130. See Stacey, supra note 3, at 331-33. 
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conjugal and parental passions” (for example, through “high rates of 
divorce, delayed marriage, cohabitation, and unwed parenthood”).131 To 
view marriage as the solution leaves out of the “conjugal fold” millions 
of citizens for whom marriage remains out of reach because of poor 
economic and employment prospects, because the law excludes them (in 
the case of same-sex couples), or because they choose to remain outside 
of marriage.132 Her alternative is a more “democratic and pluralist 
approach” to marriage and families that moves partly beyond marriage 
(as presently defined) to allow same-sex marriage and to establish a 
form of registered kinship to accommodate a broader array of families 
not structured around an adult-adult dyad (be it opposite sex or same 
sex).133 In effect, she urges support and equal regard for all “functional” 
families.134 
To support her argument for this broader form of equal regard, 
Stacey shares the stories of two “exemplary, ‘equal regard’” families, in 
which gay men and lesbians combine and disaggregate the conjugal and 
parental bonds in complex ways.135 She contends that even recognizing 
same-sex marriage would not adequately protect and support these 
“lesbigay” families.136 For example, in one such family, the biological 
parents, a lesbian and a gay man who are close friends and have a 
cooperative parenting relationship with each other, are not sexual 
intimates.137 Rather, they and their same-sex partner each form a 
household, and these partners also function as parents toward their 
partner’s biological children.138 Marriage between these same-sex 
partners would not protect the parental status of the partner who is not a 
biological parent, but plays a parental role. 
These families deserve protection, Stacey argues, because they “are 
creating familial and community models that others can profitably 
emulate and . . . that law and society should facilitate.”139 Just as 
sociologist Pepper Schwartz has argued that “peer marriage,” or an 
egalitarian form of marriage that challenges traditional gender scripts, 
                                                          
 131. Id. at 112. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 114. 
 134. Id. at 102 (employing distinction between “ideological” and “functional” families used in 
Michael Grossberg’s presentation at the Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families, held at 
Hofstra University School of Law, on March 14-15, 2003). 
 135. Id. at 102-07. 
 136. Id. at 111. 
 137. See id. at 102-04.  
 138. See id. at 104-05.  
 139. Id. at 111. 
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offers a vanguard that society might profitably follow in an effort to 
increase marital satisfaction to reduce divorce,140 Stacey appeals to such 
“lesbigay” families, who must “forge their intimate affiliations beyond 
the gendered scripts of heterosexual conjugality and reproduction,” as a 
vanguard of family diversity.141 Thus, she claims that intimate partners 
in such families approach family formation and parenting with 
heightened deliberation and agency.142 
Stacey’s portraits offer an important example of the practical reality 
of how contemporary families may diverge from the marital family 
urged by Wardle and even the “equal-regard” heterosexual model 
advocated by Browning. They also offer a useful challenge to persons, 
like myself, who believe that an important step toward equality among 
families would be recognition and support of same-sex marriage. The 
particular families Stacey profiles may need forms of family recognition 
and support beyond same-sex marriage. Thus, same-sex marriage may 
be a necessary step toward equality and may closely fit the needs of 
many same-sex couples; reports on the impact of Vermont’s civil union 
legislation reinforce this claim.143 But it may not be a sufficient step for 
other families. 
What sort of measures beyond marriage would offer support and 
recognition for “functional families” that do not fit the marriage model? 
Stacey advocates developing a kinship registration system, by analogy to 
that proposed by the Law Commission of Canada, in its report, Beyond 
Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Personal Adult Relationships 
[hereinafter Beyond Conjugality].144 What should the goals of such a 
system be? 
In the complex families described by Stacey, one motivating 
concern is to secure the parent-child relationship between de facto (but 
not biological) parents and the children whom they nurture.145 This 
consists both of recognizing and protecting the parental rights of such 
                                                          
 140. See PEPPER SCHWARTZ, LOVE BETWEEN EQUALS: HOW PEER MARRIAGE REALLY 
WORKS (1994); Pepper Schwartz, Peer Marriage, 8 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 48, 51 (1998). 
 141. Stacey, supra note 3, at 339. 
 142. See id. at 32-33. 
 143. See generally supra note 107; see OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE 
VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION (Jan. 2002), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/Final%20CURC%20Report%20for%202002.htm (last visited Jan. 
19, 2004) (detailing same-sex persons’ reports of the benefits of civil unions). 
 144. See LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING 
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at http://collection.nlc-
bnc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-cdc/beyond_conjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) 
[hereinafter BEYOND CONJUGALITY]. 
 145. See Stacey, supra note 3, at 348. 
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caretakers and of providing children with a more legally secure 
affiliation to all their parents, whether biological or de facto. Does 
family law already recognize situations in which more than two persons 
may have parental rights and responsibilities, or at least claim a 
protected relationship to a child? One relevant analogy might be the 
emerging protection of the biological parent-child relationship in “open” 
or “cooperative” adoptions, in which a biological parent’s surrender of 
the custodial and decision-making rights to an adoptive parent need not 
preclude all contact between the biological parent and adopted child (for 
example, visitation rights).146 Similarly, some legal scholars call for 
models of adoption that allow for more legal protection of the 
relationship between the birth mother and her adopted child, and for 
more cooperation between the birth and adoptive parents.147 
Another possible analogy might be blended families, in which a 
child might have two biological parents as well as one or more 
stepparents. For example, the noncustodial parent to the children may 
retain parental rights and responsibilities, but the spouse of the custodial, 
biological parent is a stepparent and may not only share in childrearing 
but may also have some legally enforceable parental rights and 
responsibilities.148 Interestingly, to reduce the conflicts and acrimony 
that may plague such blended families,149 some stepmothers and 
biological mothers are forming “co-mother” alliances to foster better 
cooperation for the sake of the children.150 Moreover, some research 
indicates that children in blended families whose noncustodial mothers 
continue to play a part in their lives fare better than children whose 
mothers do not, again suggesting the value of models that would support 
more complex family arrangements.151 
                                                          
 146. See Groves v. Clark, 982 P.2d 446, 449 (Mont. 1999) (holding that a “best interests” of 
the child standard should govern judicial evaluation of whether to enforce a visitation agreement 
made between a biological parent and adoptive parents); see also WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra 
note 30, 1200-05. 
 147. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX, AND 
EQUALITY 96-130 (1998). 
 148. See, e.g., Harmon v. Dep’t of Social Services, 951 P.2d 770, 774 (Wash. 1998) 
(interpreting Washington’s statute imposing support obligations on a stepparent). 
 149. See E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: DIVORCE 
RECONSIDERED 181-201 (2002) (detailing challenges faced by stepfamilies). 
 150. See Alex Witchel, Wives No. 1 and No. 2 Bury the Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2002, 
§ 9, at 1 (reporting that a biological mother and a stepmother formed “CoMamas Association,” 
www.comamas.com, and wrote a book, STEPWIVES: 10 STEPS TO HELP EX-WIVES AND 
STEPMOTHERS END THE STRUGGLE AND PUT THE KIDS FIRST). 
 151. See Tamar Lewin, Differences Found in Care With Stepmothers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2000, at A16. 
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The adoption and blended family models have limits, since these 
families sometimes arise out of family crisis, dissolution, and disruption, 
rather than in the deliberative, reflective way that Stacey attributes to the 
“lesbigay” families she studies. Third party visitation statutes offer 
another model for moving beyond the dyad in structuring kinship 
obligations, although the Supreme Court has held that such statutes must 
give sufficient deference to the wishes of a fit parent.152 But my point in 
bringing up these examples is that family law already has had to reckon 
with family arrangements in which conjugal and parental ties, or 
passions, are not in perfect alignment. Its efforts to do so suggest that 
society has an interest in facilitating the capacity of such families to 
function. 
A kinship registration system may be a promising approach to the 
issue of how to foster equality among families.153 In this forum, I cannot 
fully address all the important issues that necessarily would arise in 
setting about to design such a system. Here I will confine myself to 
noting some of the challenges that may be most pertinent to Stacey’s call 
for equal-regard for a broader range of families. First, one argument 
often made for favoring marriage over other forms of intimate 
association, and for linking privileges and benefits to marital status, is 
that persons who marry assume ethical and legal responsibilities to each 
other.154 The mere status of cohabitation, by contrast to marriage, does 
not give rise to such legal consequences.155 Some marriage proponents 
fear that nonmarital partners seek rights without responsibilities.156 
Although persons who marry may enter premarital and marital 
agreements that, to some extent, allow them to avoid some of these 
responsibilities, in the absence of such a contract, marriage is a legal 
relationship of mutual obligation, support, and economic 
interdependency (although sometimes this economic partnership has 
most relevance upon divorce).157 
                                                          
 152. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72, 75 (2000). 
 153. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 144, at 118-23 (offering suggestions for designing 
a registration scheme and drawing on domestic partnership and kinship registration schemes in other 
countries). 
 154. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage 
and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1457-58 (2001). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 1441, 1457.  
 157. See David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1481 
(2001). 
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In a kinship registration system, will registrants assume a menu of 
obligations to each other similar to those linked to marriage, in exchange 
for which government will link their registered status to marriage-like 
protections and benefits? Should registrants be offered various options 
with different packages of rights and obligations? Would this be an 
appropriate way for government to help facilitate persons ordering their 
intimate lives? Or, as Milton Regan contends, would any step in this 
direction of “calibrated commitment,” or offering a menu of choices 
about one’s level of commitment to an intimate partner, undermine the 
very ideal of commitment to another person upon which marriage 
depends? Thus, Regan argues that “law should be most willing to extend 
legal recognition of or protection for cohabitation when doing so 
reinforces an ethic of care and commitment in intimate relationships.”158 
How might proponents of kinship registration schemes respond to 
Regan’s concerns? One possible response is to note that many domestic 
partnership schemes (both municipal and state) include in the definition 
of who qualifies as a domestic partner that persons undertake to be 
responsible for each other in various ways.159 To this extent, they appear 
to express an ideal of mutual responsibility and interdependency. At the 
same time, Regan might respond that, unlike the rights and 
responsibilities created by the status of marriage, a domestic partnership 
does not create obligations of support that survive the end of a 
relationship, nor do most such schemes create property interests either 
during or at the end of the relationship by analogy to schemes of marital 
property, equitable distribution, and community property.160 However, 
the limited extent of many domestic partnership laws may reflect less on 
what sorts of responsibilities partners are willing to assume than on 
public policy concerns that creating alternatives to marriage may make 
marriage less necessary or attractive (as well as, in the case of local 
domestic partnership laws, the limited authority of municipalities, as 
compared to states, to regulate in the area of family law).161 
Second, protecting the “lesbigay” families that Stacey describes 
through kinship registration might be a politically feasible step precisely 
because these families still hold to one important part of the 
                                                          
 158. Regan, supra note 154, at 1450. 
 159. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297(a), (b)(2) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1, 572C-6 
(2003); see also Craig Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and 
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1187 (1992) 
(discussing various municipal ordinances). 
 160. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 299.5(b)-(e). 
 161. See supra Part II.B (discussing critical familism’s opposition to marriage equivalents). 
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conventional marital dyad: a monogamous, sexual bond between two, 
rather than more, adults. These “postmodern” “lesbigay” families offer 
persuasive evidence that it may be possible to provide a secure and 
nurturing environment for children in complex family arrangements in 
which more than two adults may serve as parents to a child and in which 
intimate sexual affiliation does not exist between the biological parents 
or unite all the persons acting as parents to a child. Yet, in a sense, these 
families might be said to combine conjugal and parental passions in an 
important way: same-sex adult intimate partners also share parenting 
responsibilities, even though one parent is a biological parent, and the 
other is not. 
By contrast, equal regard for a broader array of families would also 
seek, as Stacey proposes, to move beyond the sexual dyad to protect 
intimate affiliation involving more than two sexual partners.162 Already, 
social conservatives fear that Lawrence’s protection of a same-sex 
couple’s sexual intimacy is but a prelude to clamorings for protections of 
polygamy and polyamory.163 On this panel, for example, Martha Ertman 
offered examples of unconventional families in which sexual affiliation 
deviates from the monogamous dyad.164 I suspect that this type of move 
beyond marriage will be much more controversial precisely because of 
how deeply entrenched the ideal of the exclusive, monogamous couple is 
in this Nation’s social norms about sexual intimacy.165 Some scholars 
contend that there are principled reasons to favor and protect the 
monogamous sexual dyad (whether heterosexual or homosexual) over 
plural sexual groupings.166 Other scholars urge that perhaps a 
reexamination of the prohibition on polygamy or group marriage is in 
order.167 
In this Article, I cannot give full consideration to the debate over 
focusing family law on a sexual affiliation between two persons, rather 
than among more than two persons. But I will note two concerns that 
would guide my evaluation of it. One issue is determining what equal 
regard for such plural groups would entail and what specific forms either 
of state action, or restraint from action, is appropriate or is sought. To 
return to the Lawrence court’s framework, what form of “respect” for 
                                                          
 162. See Stacey, supra note 3, at 347. 
 163. See Kurtz, supra note 9. 
 164. See Ertman, supra note 17. 
 165. See generally COTT, supra note 27. 
 166. See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 39, at 1520-26. 
 167. See David Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 80-81 
(1997). 
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their intimate choices do groups of sexual intimates seek? Is it freedom 
to pursue their intimate lives without state intervention in the form of 
criminal sanction? Do they seek equal civil rights in terms of not 
allowing their form of sexual affiliation to be a basis for discrimination 
in such areas as housing and employment? Do they argue that 
government has no business favoring or disfavoring any form of sexual 
affiliation, or of using intimate sexual relationships as a basis for 
assigning rights, obligations, and privileges?168 Or do they instead seek 
to broaden the definition of state-supported families, contending that 
plural sexual groups, or polyamorous groups, who stand ready to assume 
relational responsibilities toward each other should receive the set of 
benefits and protections for their relationships that flow from marriage? 
If so, is marriage to be the appropriate benchmark of that set, or would a 
different menu of choices be desirable? 
A second concern is: when groups of sexual intimates also produce 
and rear children, how will parental rights and responsibilities attach to 
the group? What impact will these arrangements have on child well-
being? It has been possible to bring social science research to bear on the 
issue of gay and lesbian parenting in order to offer strong evidence of 
the capacity of gay men and lesbians to be loving, capable parents and to 
produce flourishing, healthy children.169 Does any comparable literature 
exist about children in plural family settings? If one believes, as I do, 
that a functional approach to families should be one important guide to 
how best to support families, then it is appropriate to ask about how such 
complex families actually function in terms of fostering child well-being 
and orderly social reproduction.170 
Finally, in addition to these two concerns, one concern about a 
kinship registration scheme is whether a focus on sexual affiliation, or 
the conjugal bond, is too narrow, and whether equality among families 
requires moving “beyond conjugality.” As the Canadian report, Beyond 
Conjugality suggests, a kinship registration system might also include 
close adult personal relationships that involve neither sexual affiliation 
to another adult, nor a caretaking relationship to a child.171 I believe that 
there is some merit to this proposal. 
                                                          
 168. See infra Part III.B for discussion of Martha Fineman’s critique of the sexual family. 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 170. On this functional approach, see Rawls, supra note 92, at 779. 
 171. At the Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families conference, for example, 
Nancy Polikoff presented a paper, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 217 
(2003), arguing in support of such a move, and citing the report BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 
143. 
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As the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State172 noted, state 
recognition and support of marriage rests in part on the assumption that 
it may foster the security and stability of this intimate, committed 
relationship; thus, extending the benefits and obligations of marriage to 
same-sex couples would welcome them into this “family” of state-
sanctioned relationships and provide them similar benefits.173 If this 
basic premise of the facilitative role of state support and recognition is 
sound, then why limit it to marriage? Why not extend it to a more 
diverse range of family forms? As the Law Commission of Canada 
found, “[m]arriage, from the point of view of secular state authority, is a 
means of facilitating in an orderly fashion the voluntary assumption of 
mutual rights and obligations by adults committed to each other’s well-
being.”174 However: 
[Marriage] is no longer a sufficient model to respond to the variety of 
relationships that exist in Canada today. Whether we look at older 
people living with their adult children, adults with disabilities living 
with their caregivers, or siblings cohabiting in the same residence, the 
marriage model is inadequate. Some of these other relationships are 
also characterized by emotional and economic interdependence, mutual 
care and concern and the expectation of some duration. All of these 
personal adult relationships could also benefit from legal frameworks 
to support people’s need for certainty and stability.175 
I believe that this call to move “beyond conjugality” issues a 
valuable challenge that provides the opportunity for critical reflection 
upon the facilitative role of government in supporting intimate 
affiliation.176 To be sure, developing a kinship registration system would 
entail many contextual inquiries and assessments. For example, as the 
Law Commission proposed, it could require examining what legitimate 
ends government pursues when it uses relationship status as a criterion 
(for example, using marriage as a proxy for the assignment of certain 
benefits and obligations) and whether law should be revised to cover a 
                                                          
 172. 744 A.2d 864 (1999). 
 173. See id. at 886. 
 174. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 144, at 129. 
 175. Id. at 113-14. For an example of a close adult personal relationship that might fit these 
criteria, see Alex Witchel, Savoring the Chemistry of Southern Cooking, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, 
at F1 (reporting on the close relationship between two chefs, an eighty-seven-year-old African-
American woman and a forty-year-old white gay man who lives with and cares for her, noting that 
they “have forged a genuine family, with a devotion too rarely seen among blood relations”). 
 176. For other discussion of this report in this symposium, see Polikoff, supra note 171. 
MCCLAIN.PRINT.DOC 3/30/2004 1:50 PM 
412 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:379 
broader range of relevant relationships.177 I believe that it would also 
focus on issues concerning the goods linked to and functions assigned to 
the marital family, whether marriage is an adequate or imperfect proxy 
for families deserving governmental support, and inquiries about under 
what conditions families may engage in orderly social reproduction. 
Notwithstanding the challenges these developments would face, I 
believe that moving toward a registration system would be a promising 
step toward fostering greater equality among families. 
B. Why Not Move All the Way Beyond Marriage? 
A radically different approach to the question “beyond marriage” is 
to move wholly beyond marriage and to center family law and policy 
around something else entirely. Thus, Martha Fineman argues for 
abolishing marriage.178 She would not just de-center or “pluralize” 
marriage, as Stacey suggests, by supporting marriage plus a range of 
registered kinships, but would dethrone marriage in the sense of 
removing it from its exclusive place of power and prominence in family 
law and policy.179 Indeed, Fineman objects to the place of marriage as 
“perhaps our only clear family policy,” and contends that “clinging” to 
marriage limits the coherent development of family policy and precludes 
examining other solutions to “social problems involving children and 
poverty.”180 
Fineman would “abolish marriage as a legal category” and 
disaggregate the functions marriage is expected to serve.181 The adult-
adult heterosexual affiliation thought to lie at the core of marriage would 
cease to define “family” and to be the basis for state regulation, subsidy, 
and protection.182 Instead, sexual affiliates would negotiate the terms of 
their relationships under a regime of contract law.183 Heterosexuality 
would no longer be the state-preferred norm; indeed, the state would 
have minimal interest in the regulation of sexuality (except for 
                                                          
 177. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 144, at 118 (detailing four-part method). In 
colloquy at the Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families, Canadian legal scholar Mary 
Jane Mossman observed that government officials estimated that applying the methodology 
proposed in Beyond Conjugality to all relevant Canadian laws would require an impractically 
lengthy process. See Mary Jane Mossman, Conversations About Families in Canadian Courts and 
Legislatures: Are There “Lessons” for the United States?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2003). 
 178. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 245. 
 179. See id. at 253. 
 180. Fineman, supra note 15; see also FINEMAN, supra note 115, at 269.  
 181. Fineman, supra note 2, at 261. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 261. 
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prohibiting forced sex and protecting children).184 Fineman contends that 
taking the husband-wife relationship out of family law reveals what is 
left: the dependency of the child (or other family members incapable of 
caring for her or himself).185 It is this caretaking function served by 
families, argues Fineman, that is the most important contemporary 
function assigned to families and it is that function that should be the 
focus of state recognition, protection, and subsidy.186 
Fineman’s proposed thought experiment—abolishing marriage and 
substituting contract for status—is a bracing one. She puts several 
challenges to persons, such as myself, who quest for an approach to 
equality among families that retains marriage but also supports and 
recognizes other forms of family. Is holding onto marriage supportable? 
Or is she correct in contending that, “for all relevant and appropriate 
societal purposes” we do not need the legal institution of marriage at 
all?187 We don’t need marriage as a legal category around which to build 
social policy; caretaking would be a more appropriate connection.188 
Therefore, she contends, we could transfer to the caretaker-dependent 
relationship all the social and material subsidies now associated with 
marriage.189 
To respond to Fineman’s challenge, I will pose some challenges in 
return. This may help to highlight the stakes in moving wholly beyond 
marriage, as she suggests, or, as I suggest, retaining marriage but 
extending the facilitative role of the state to supporting other family 
relationships as well (or a “marriage plus” approach). 
At the outset, it is useful to understand how Fineman arrives at her 
proposals. She interprets several trends within family law that may be 
characterized as moves “beyond marriage” and also takes into account 
changing patterns of family formation. Most significant among these 
legal trends is the move toward contract: within family law, persons who 
marry are increasingly able to use private contract to set and alter the 
terms of their relationship.190 Fineman notes that this permits individuals 
to pour their own meanings into marriage.191 But she questions whether 
it is possible to point to any core meanings or functions of marriage 
                                                          
 184. See id. at 262, 271 n.66. 
 185. See id. at 266-67. 
 186. See Fineman, supra note 15. 
 187. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 245. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Fineman, supra note 15. 
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 191. See id. 
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(other than the caretaking relationship) that could be defended by 
publicly supportable reasons.192 
Fineman also contends that the extension of family rights and 
responsibilities independent of marital status makes marriage less central 
a category; indeed, she questions whether society needs, or can justify, 
marriage’s privileged place as the basis for state distribution of social 
and economic goods.193 Fineman further factors in two significant shifts: 
first, away from legal disfavor of divorce to a regime of no-fault divorce, 
and second, away from marriage as a hierarchical relationship between 
the husband/head of household and the wife/dependent to marriage as an 
equal partnership.194 Added to these legal changes are changes in 
patterns of family formation, so that many households take forms other 
than the marital family. 
Is Fineman’s scheme preferable to the sort of marriage plus 
approach that I support, which has some affinities to Stacey’s conception 
of equal regard? I will highlight the most salient factors that lead me to 
prefer a marriage plus approach and to be cautious about Fineman’s 
approach. In particular, I discuss the facilitative role of governmental 
recognition and support of intimate relationships and why a model of 
private contract may not be as facilitative. 
One rationale for Fineman’s embrace of contract as a way to 
organize sexual affiliates’ relationships is that society no longer uses 
marriage to manage the problem of female dependency, but instead 
recognizes women as possessing the capacity to contract, to earn, and to 
order their intimate lives. No longer do legal disabilities attach to 
married women, impairing their capacity for economic citizenship, and 
the gender complementary of the husband-wife provider/caretaker dyad 
has given way to a norm of equal partnership. Thus, Fineman notes that 
one rationale for allowing premarital agreements has been recognition 
that adult women possess the capacity to contract and do not need the 
special protection and solicitude of the state. If society has already 
moved this far toward contract, and private ordering, why not move all 
the way to private contract? Fineman contends that replacing marriage 
with contract is a necessary step toward gender equality.195 
I resist removing adult-adult sexual affiliation from the definition of 
family and relegating it solely to private contract. To do so seems to 
undervalue adult-adult interdependency and to miss the important 
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 194. See FINEMAN, supra note 115, at 158-59. 
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facilitative role government may play in supporting such forms of adult 
affiliation. Surely, Fineman is right that we should shed no tears over the 
demise of state-sanctioned gender complementarity that left wives 
dependent on husbands and hindered women’s capacity for responsible 
self-government. But even if this “dependency” piece of the family is no 
longer a salient one, compared with, for example, the dependency of 
children, family law has transformed this piece into interdependency, 
through duties of mutual support between husbands and wives.196 This 
transformation of a feature of marriage so directly bound up, as Fineman 
observes, with gender hierarchy197 is a useful example of how marriage 
as a legal form may foster, rather than hinder, mutuality and equality 
within families. 
Along with interdependency are bundled other goods associated 
with adult-adult intimate affiliation: goods such as commitment, 
friendship, relational responsibility, and taking an interest in the well-
being of another person. As some family law scholars contend, marriage 
remains the most potent symbol of such a commitment.198 Arguments for 
recognizing same-sex marriage stress the importance of official 
recognition and support of committed intimate relationships.199 As 
discussed above, Baker v. State commented on the facilitative role of 
such official recognition and support, just as the Canada Law 
Commission contends that nonconjugal adult relationships would also 
benefit from such support.200 Would a regime of private contract be an 
adequate substitute? I am skeptical. I think it is a move in the wrong 
direction to make such relationships private rather than allowing a 
broader range of relationships to benefit from governmental recognition 
and support. 
To be sure, Fineman makes a very valuable point when she speaks 
of the many individualized meanings that marriage allows, in the wake 
of the erosion of state-enforced sex-linked duties and the ascent of 
contractual freedom to avoid some of the economic consequences of 
                                                          
 196. On this transformation, see Wriggins, supra note 107, at 283. 
 197. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 262. 
 198. See generally Regan, supra note 154; MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF 
INTIMACY 1-5 (1993). 
 199. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003) (observing that 
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benefits afforded to married couples and their children”). I discuss this in Chapter 6 of THE PLACE 
OF FAMILIES, supra note 20. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73; see generally, BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra 
note 144. 
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marriage.201 Anyone seeking (as I do) to retain a place for marriage in 
family law and policy should take up her challenge of whether it is fair 
for government to use marriage as a relevant status for the assignment of 
various rights and obligations. Of course, my contention is that marriage 
may not deserve its exclusive status, but that a move, for example, 
toward registered kinship would remedy this form of inequality. But 
Fineman’s discussion of the power of contract to alter the terms and to 
pluralize the meanings of marriage202 usefully invites questions about 
fairness. If a married couple, for example, bargains to eliminate any 
economic obligations to each other and to minimize any economic 
interdependency, is it fair to let them invoke marital status as a basis for 
receiving special economic benefits from employers and insurers that are 
premised on the expectation of such interdependency? Or is this an 
example of seeking rights without responsibilities? Does the focus on the 
formal status of marriage divert attention from whether other types of 
families in fact embody such interdependency (or in the case of parent-
child, dependency)? 
Fineman’s proposal would not remove governmental recognition 
and support from all family forms. In particular, the caretaker-dependent 
relationship would be the appropriate status to which government would 
link benefits and supports. As Fineman puts it, her objective is “to 
replace the marital family and its sexual and reproductive affiliation as 
the core tie, with the caretaking family and its relationship of care and 
dependency as useful to the objective of social policy.”203 I resist exiling 
the adult-adult relationship from what counts as family, and replacing it 
solely with the caretaking family. On the one hand, I believe that the sort 
of family diversity Stacey and Fineman describe render it unrealistic to 
quest for the type of perfect alignment of sexual (or conjugal) and 
parental passion sought by marriage promoters (like Wardle and 
Browning) who want to re-enshrine marriage’s place as the exclusive 
institution within which to order sexuality, reproduction, and 
parenting.204 But I would quest for more inclusive solutions to family 
definition, such as supporting and recognizing the complex family 
arrangements of the “lesbigay” families described by Stacey, rather than 
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excluding significant dimensions of family life, such as the range of 
emotional, sexual, and reproductive connections that may unite adults in 
a marriage, or in a nonmarital committed, intimate relationship. I am not 
persuaded that the disaggregation of the adult-adult connection from the 
parent-child connection that Fineman proposes is the best way to address 
the forms of inequality among families she powerfully describes. Indeed, 
perhaps the best argument in favor of her proposal is that it directly 
seeks to remedy this inequality by shifting the valuation of nonmarital, 
single-parent families from deviant to normal and deserving.205 
Is there any other remedy for this inequality? Why not include 
marriage and other forms of registered kinship as deserving forms of 
family, along with the caretaking family? There may be a risk that 
failure to include adult-adult affiliations would send a message that they 
do not implicate any public concerns. Is this a message that is desirable? 
For example, as Mary Lyndon Shanley observes, “the public does have 
an interest in the terms of marriage” and in “promoting equality of 
husband and wife, both as spouses and as citizens.”206 I believe that 
Fineman makes a very useful point when she suggests that “we are 
making certain assumptions about the capabilities and capacities of 
marriage as distinguished from other types of family relationships—
assumptions that may no longer be warranted about its unique ability to 
accomplish certain societal functions.”207 As I argue in other work, 
focusing on capacity in this way is one impetus supporting a move to 
greater equality among families. Perhaps my central point of divergence 
from Fineman is that I do not believe that it is necessary or desirable to 
go all the way beyond marriage to foster this equality. 
To be sure, in contrast to my argument that contract is not 
facilitative enough, Fineman might well counter that not only is a regime 
of contract facilitative and flexible, but it, unlike marriage, does not 
come with the baggage of sex inequality. Yet, as the recent American 
Law Institute Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution suggests, there 
may be forms of inequality that arise in intimate relationships that 
warrant concern and that caution against too heavy a reliance on contract 
alone.208 Fineman refers to the Principles as offering further evidence of 
                                                          
 205. On the use of “deviant” to label such families, see FINEMAN, supra note 115, at 101-42. 
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marriage becoming more like other relationships, and the extension of 
the category of “domestic partner” to couples outside of marriage as 
evidence that there is less need for a “well-established system of default 
rules imposed by the state,” since the focus is less on formal status of 
marriage, than on the “nature and quality of the relationship that the 
parties have crafted.”209 She is certainly correct that the Principles do 
not view the absence of formal marriage as dispositive of the question of 
whether parties in an intimate relationship have any responsibilities to 
each other. Yet, far from evidencing the declining significance of 
marriage and the ascent of private ordering, the Principles instead seem 
to indicate marriage’s continuing force as a relevant analytical category 
and source of analogy and may even extend its reach. They would 
impose rules and policies governing marriage and divorce to persons 
formally outside of marriage but who have the same status because of 
the nature of their relationship.210 
In what sense is this moving beyond marriage? It is more a move to 
status than to contract, since one animating premise is that “formal 
contracts can never be the exclusive source of the rights and obligations 
that arise between persons who live in a family relationship.”211 For if 
the default rule used to be that nonmarried intimate partners needed to 
make an express contract in order for their relationship to trigger 
responsibilities and economic consequences, the Principles instead 
assume that, absent an express contract, nonmarital partners who have a 
marriage-like relationship should be brought under the umbrella of 
marriage law. Although the Principles would permit couples to contract 
with each other and expressly avoid economic consequences attaching to 
their common life, even here policy concerns and concerns for capacity 
would put limits on contract. By contrast to Fineman’s approach, the 
Principles seem to judge that it is not desirable to leave it wholly in the 
hands of the bargaining individuals whether their intimate relationships 
will have any consequences, leading some commentators to critique the 
Principles for its discarding of autonomy of such partners, as well as its 
conflation of marriage and cohabitation.212 
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Fineman does not dwell on the uneasiness the Principles express 
about contract as a vehicle for organizing family life, or on its stated 
reasons for limiting the reach of contract. By contrast to the historical 
form of sex-linked incapacity arising out of disabilities attending the 
status of wife, contemporary concerns about constraints on capacity 
focus more on the context of family relationships and the extent to which 
bargaining in this context “may disarm [a person’s] capacity for self-
protective judgment, or their inclination to exercise it, as compared to 
parties negotiating other kinds of concerns.”213 Moreover, the Principles 
also note important policy concerns about the economic interdependency 
that may arise between adult partners, particularly when they rear 
children together and otherwise invest in family life.214 Although 
Fineman indicates that her approach would inevitably have some default 
rules and ameliorating doctrines to accompany contract, I worry that she 
is overly sanguine about matters of capacity and contract. Admittedly, it 
is fine line between rejecting contract in a way that may reinforce 
stereotypes about women’s incapacity (as Fineman rightly criticizes) and 
being wary of contract because the problem of “disarming” one’s 
capacity for protective judgment may especially affect women, given 
continuing patterns of how women invest disproportionately to men in 
family life.215 
In sum, rather than dethrone marriage and confine the definition of 
“family” to the caretaking family, I would support including adult-adult 
intimate affiliation along with caretaking as valuable forms of family 
deserving support and recognition. I do not deny that private contracts 
about intimate association may be facilitative and should have a place in 
a just and fair approach to family law. Fineman’s thought experiment 
poses a burden of persuasion and justification on those, like me, who 
believe there is a place for marriage—and other government-supported 
forms of adult intimate affiliation—in an account of the place of 
families, but I believe that is a burden that can be met. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, to the question “should family law and policy move 
beyond marriage?,” I have answered “yes and no.” Due regard for 
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equality within families as well as equality among families should 
inform family law and policy. In responding to the warning that any 
evolution in the definition of marriage threatens marriage’s role as a 
“seedbed of civic virtue,” undergirding constitutional democracy, I have 
contended that the simple appeal to historical definitions of marriage—
and to gender complementarity—are not persuasive. More promising are 
efforts to engage with and reflect critically upon tradition and, as 
Massachusetts’ highest court recently expressed it, view marriage as an 
“evolving paradigm” that, over time, better instantiates ideals of liberty 
and equality.216 Such critical engagement and reflection, I have argued, 
supports an argument that a logical next step in the law’s evolution from 
marriage as a hierarchical relationship in which husband and wife have 
sex-linked rights and duties to marriage as an equal partnership is to 
recognize same-sex marriage.  
This Article has also taken up arguments that equality among 
families requires not simply recognizing same-sex marriage, but moving 
beyond marriage, either by extending governmental support and 
recognition to other forms of committed, intimate relationships between 
adults or by redefining “family” around the parent-child, or caretaker-
dependent relationship. To these arguments, I have agreed that some 
movement beyond marriage is an appropriate step toward equality 
among families, whether it be through a kinship registration system or 
some other means of according official recognition and support to forms 
of intimate association other than marriage. However, I have resisted the 
proposal to move wholly beyond marriage. I have done so both because 
of the important, facilitative role that official recognition and support of 
marriage accords to those who marry and because of the limits of private 
contract as a basis for establishing and regulating intimacy. Yet calls to 
move beyond marriage do pose a challenge to those who (like myself) 
believe that marriage (re-defined to include same-sex marriage) justly 
continues to have a place in our constitutional democracy as a symbol of 
commitment and as an institution triggering a panoply of benefits, rights, 
and obligations. That challenge is to work toward a family law and 
policy that, on the one hand, supports and recognizes marriage, because 
of the personal and social goods it fosters (including its role in orderly 
social reproduction), but, on the other, does not use marriage as the 
exclusive proxy for those forms of family capable of fostering such 
goods, and thus also warranting support and recognition. Meeting that 
challenge will be a vital next step in developing the “evolving paradigm” 
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of the public institution of civil marriage, as well as an approach to 
family law and policy that is more attentive to equality among families. 
